There is ample evidence that New Delhi’s ambitions of becoming a
global power has met with fresh challenges in its neighbourhood. In
recent times, Sri Lanka has radiated unnerving resentment at India’s
attempts to secure the rights of the Tamil civilian population, victims
of the Eelam war that vanquished the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE).
At one level, New Delhi is building pressure on Colombo
not to take the bilateral relations for granted. National Security
Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon reportedly conveyed this during his June 29
trip to the country. Apart from being an influential neighbour, India is
also the member of United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)’s
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) troika, which is scheduled to take up
Colombo’s human rights compliance record in November. So Colombo is
obligated not to displease New Delhi, which has already voted against it
in the UNHRC in March 2012.
India – Sri Lanka Relations
At
the other level, India’s pressure diplomacy is on a weak footing. For
the Mahinda Rajpaksa government, victory in the Eelam war that ended
three years ago remains its only achievement. Even as the economic
condition of the country has worsened and governance capacities
weakened, official effort at projecting the President as a saviour of
Sinhalas has continued.
Apparently, such a project runs counter to
India’s push for the implementation of the 13th Amendment and the
recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
(LLRC) and elections for the provincial councils. Not surprisingly, the
Rajapaksa government has not moved beyond its ‘commitment’ to the above
demands. Issues like the resettlement of the internally displaced
population and a genuine reconciliation programme have progressed at an
unacceptable pace.
Add to this, India’s own aid programmes in the
past two years in Sri Lanka— $50 million under lines of credit and
another $350 million under grants-in-aid — has not impressed the Tamils
as well. They allege that whereas Colombo has vigorously pursued a
programme of land grabbing and settling Sinhala civilians and the army
in what used to be Tamil territories, the Indian projects such as
building houses for displaced Tamils have progressed lethargically.
Quite
apparently, the Indian ‘pressure tactic’ is loathed by the Sinhalas, if
the July 9 editorial of the Sunday Times newspaper is any indication.
“The Government seems to have got trapped in a comment the President
made to India that he would implement the 13th Amendment and even go
further (13 plus). He said this initially to get Indian support to
defeat the LTTE on the battlefield. Now, the Indians, like the dog with
the bone, will not let go,” the editorial read. It went on to allege
that “India would like to have an elected” Northern Provincial Council
as “an ideal satellite province on Sri Lankan soil—‘an unsinkable
aircraft carrier’ on India’s southern border.”
New Delhi has
obvious reasons to worry. There has not been an opinion poll reflecting
India’s image in Sri Lanka. But the reaction one gathers from the
letters written to the editors of different newspapers and websites, the
image isn’t much different from what the people of Pakistan think of
the Americans—both among the Sinhalas and the Tamils.
In Sri
Lanka, India’s problem is unique in terms of finding an effective
vehicle for implementation of its projects for the Tamils. While the
ruling regime’s negative approach to the reconciliation and
rehabilitation process is quite clear, the mainstream opposition too
does not provide an alternative. Take the case of former army chief
Sarath Fonseka. After being released from prison, he has assumed the
role of an opposition figurehead and has called for an Arab Spring in
Sri Lanka to oust the Rajapaksa regime. Fonseka’s denial of human rights
violations during the Eelam war is more virulent than the Rajpakasa
regime. He, in fact, accuses the government of not having forcefully
conveyed this to the international community.
Within days of
Menon’s return from Colombo, President Rajapaksa gathered the Sri Lankan
diplomats in a workshop. Referring to the “changing functions of
diplomacy” in view of the campaign by pro-LTTE diaspora in the West, the
President called upon the diplomats to have a “readiness, willingness
and capability” to “persuade others about the needs of Sri Lanka”. The
message of “no change” Colombo is trying to deliver to the world is
obvious.
For New Delhi, there can be no alternative to a policy of
sustained engagement with the Rajapaksa regime. Appointment of a
special envoy on Sri Lanka is not a bad idea for the Prime Minister’s
Office to consider.