With U.S. forces out of Iraq and NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan
proceeding apace, the effort to identify lessons learned from these
conflicts is intensifying. This may sound like just an academic exercise
but it will have real consequences in terms of future force structure,
procurement, R&D and training. A lot of the lessons identified so
far have to do either with promising technologies such as unmanned
aerial systems, multispectral sensors or IED jammers or with
pre-conflict intelligence as in know thy enemy.
The first and most important lesson from more than a decade of fighting
violent extremist organizations across the globe and even at home is
this: it takes a network to defeat a network. U.S. forces have always
been able to deliver overwhelming firepower at all levels of combat. The
losses they have inflicted on the insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere have been enormous. Yet, as former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld is alleged to have once observed, the enemy is recruiting them
faster than we can kill them. To defeat an insurgent or terrorist
network, it takes much more than raw power. It takes a strategy that
seeks to employ a wide range of military and non-military instruments to
pick apart the adversary’s organization. In other words, it takes a
network.
All large scale military operations involve the creation and employment
of networks. Look at all the Pentagon’s major campaigns of the past two
decades. Establishing air dominance in the Balkans, over Iraq (twice)
and in Libya required a sophisticated network of platforms and systems
ranging from cruise-missile firing submarines and surface combatants,
land and sea-based tactical aircraft, manned and unmanned ISR platforms
and an armada of aerial refueling tankers. Supporting and sustaining
these forces was an array of military planners, intelligence analysts,
targeteers and logistics and maintenance personnel. A similar network
exists for operations on land and at sea. The networks get even larger
and more complex for joint and combined arms operations.
But going after the more complex threats of the future will require more
nuanced and agile approaches to building, maintaining and directing our
networks. The networks we are currently fighting consist of much more
than just a few charismatic leaders and their gun or bomb-toting foot
soldiers. They also consist of planners, bomb makers, financiers,
logistics and transportation specialists. Beyond those individuals that
could be called “officially” part of the extremist organization are a
host of individuals and organizations that present themselves as
legitimate and peaceful. In fact, many of these may be unwitting
contributors to the extremist network. Even further back, hiding in the
shadows are hostile, indifferent or incapable governments providing
sanctuary, support or even direction.
Even high end threats are increasingly based on networks. The so-called
anti-access/area denial threats consist of networks of platforms,
systems and capabilities deployed by foreign militaries, paramilitary
organizations and non-state groups. The U.S. is under continuous cyber
assault from groups and individuals that we believe are backed by or
cooperating with national governments.
In a decade of conflict in the Middle East, the United States has
learned how to create and employ sophisticated networks precisely for
the purpose of countering those of our adversaries. The Joint IED Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) provides an example of how a network can be
created, one that includes the whole of government, our allies and the
private sector, to go after all elements of the terrorist system from
the devices themselves all the way back to the financiers. The Army’s
Rapid Equipping Force (REF) is another example of a successful network,
one designed to respond rapidly to urgent operational needs from the
theater. Task Force Odin is a third example, this time focused on the
collection, fusion and rapid dissemination of tactically useful
intelligence. All three of these organizations provide the critical
central “node” around which a full network could be built and operated.
Now, as defense budgets shrink and forces are downsized, there is a
danger not only that we will lose sight of this most important lesson,
but will disband the critical organizations that created and directed
them. Right now organizations such as JIEDDO and the REF are fighting
for their very survival. They need to be treated as among the crown
jewels in the development of future capabilities and the creation of
networks with which to defeat future adversaries. Like the Air Force’s
Checkmate organization, the Navy’s Office of Naval Reactors or OSD’s
Office of Net Assessment, JIEDDO, REF and the like must be protected,
funded and directed to figuring out how to defeat the networked threats
of the future.
