US and South Korean analysts are annoyed and frustrated by China’s
policy toward North Korea. In their eyes, Beijing’s policy not only
jeopardizes the security of the US and the ROK and undermines
international norms, but is detrimental to China’s own national
interests as well.
But judgments about whether China’s North Korea policy is illogical or
self-defeating depend very much on what people see as China’s goals.
Most Chinese analysts would argue that China’s policy has its own
internal logic; whether the US and South Korea see that logic is a
different matter.
The widely accepted assumption is that China has three goals when it
comes to North Korea: stability (no implosion and no war), peace
(diplomatic normalization between the US and North Korea), and
denuclearization/nonproliferation. Among these three, China prioritizes
stability over peace and denuclearization. The secondary status of
denuclearization is a sore spot for Washington and Seoul, which see it
as the most important goal (or should be). And while different
priorities lead to different approaches, North Korean actions have been
destabilizing. Therefore, China’s strategy is counterproductive in terms
of its own priority, hence illogical.
This analysis misses a more fundamental, strategic aspect of China’s
views of its security environment and the North Korea issue. China is
increasingly anxious and concerned about US strategic intentions toward
China and the China-related utility of its military alliances in East
Asia. For most Chinese, Americans and South Koreans cite the North Korea
threat to justify the existence and strengthening of the military
alliance, creating the impression that the alliance will lose its raison
d’etre after the North Korea issue is solved. The US and ROK have in
recent years sought to “regionalize” and “globalize” the alliance with
no clear indication that the future alliance would not “target” or
“affect” China. This raises a fundamental question in China: why should
China help the US and ROK on North Korea against its own security
interests?
The announcement of the US pivot to Asia has intensified these
suspicions and concerns. Most Chinese and US analysts believe that the
problem between their two countries is structural. They share the view
that the rise of China inevitably threatens the US status as a
superpower. This power structure dictates that some of the most
important goals and policies of the two countries will conflict.
Therefore, the US pivot to Asia, including its perceived “meddling” in
South China Sea disputes and increasing deployments in the Asia Pacific,
are seen as specific steps to counter China’s rise. The US-ROK alliance
is an intrinsic element of this strategy (with or without the North
Korea problem). Hence, China’s logic regarding North Korea policy is
clear: China will not help the US and ROK solve the North Korea problem
or speed up a China-unfriendly resolution since China is “next on the
list.”
Many Chinese analysts see Seoul’s ambiguity when it comes to addressing
China’s concerns as unfortunate. For them, Seoul is using ambiguity
toward China’s concerns to maximize its policy flexibility, play the US
and China against each other to improve its own position, and act as a
middle power balancer between the two. Therefore, when South Koreans
criticize China’s North Korea policy or lobby for a change, Chinese
respond with the old “stability” argument, but privately think that “You
can’t have your cake and eat it too.”
To be fair, China’s North Korea policy is problematic. North Korean
provocations cost China dearly: financially, politically, and when it
comes to security. Ample debates within the Chinese policy community on
what it should do about North Korea are a powerful demonstration of how
serious the issue has become and how uncomfortable China is. However,
when China puts the issue in the broader context of US-China relations
and regional dynamics, North Korea isn’t the most serious or fundamental
challenge to China’s national security and strategic interests. The
current policy is problematic, but the alternative seems worse. That’s
why China chooses to muddle through while hoping economic reform will
bring about a North Korea modeled after China.
To dissuade China of this logic will be extremely difficult. It will
require serious and reliable reassurances by the US and South Korea that
the future of their alliance will not come at China’s expense. This
could be strategically unwise and politically impossible. Given the
amount of distrust China harbors, it may not even work. But without such
dissuasion, lobbying China for a policy change on North Korea will
fail.
China might change its strategic calculation if North Korea launches new
provocations and drags the region into a military conflict. China may
not be willing to step into a direct conflict with the US and will try
to manage tension through other channels. However, as shown by China’s
response to the two nuclear tests and provocations in 2010, Beijing’s
tolerance for North Korea is quite high. People often wonder what China
can NOT tolerate when it comes to North Korea.
A third possibility is that North Korea implodes or China falls before
it rises. These might happen, but so far no country is basing its policy
on those possibilities.
China knows that it has to live with the US-ROK alliance. There is
practically nothing China can do to stop it, although Beijing doesn’t
like that either. As long as China is hostile toward and suspicious
about the strategic intentions of the US and China’s “utility” in the
future US-ROK military alliance, Beijing sees no reason to change its
policy on North Korea issue to speed up any resolution of the problem.