Recent reports from Pakistan seem to suggest the Pakistan Navy (PN)
may be on the cusp of developing a naval nuclear missile capability,
even as its plans for acquiring a nuclear submarine capability gradually
become clearer. The first indication of this came in May 2012 when
Pakistan tested the Hatf VII (Babur)—an indigenously developed Cruise
Missile with high precision and manoeuvrability. Reports suggested that
the missile was launched from a state-of-the-art multi-tube Missile
Launch Vehicle (MLV), which significantly enhances the targeting and
employment options of the Babur Weapon System in both the conventional
and nuclear modes. Importantly, this is the third test of the Babur in
the recent past, of different capacities and loads.
Then,
in another significant development, on May 19, the PN inaugurated the
Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). A statement
from the Pakistan military’s Inter Services Public Relations said that
the NSFC “will perform a pivotal role in development and employment of
the Naval Strategic Force,” and was “the custodian of the nation’s 2nd
strike capability” – presumably for use against India, in case the need
ever arose. This is noteworthy because Pakistan is not known to have a
sea-based second strike capability. Therefore, a public statement that
the NSFC would be in-charge of such a capability is an open admission of
sorts that Pakistan is in the process of developing a naval variant of a
strategic nuclear missile.
For long, the Pakistan Navy has viewed
the Indian Navy (IN) with suspicion. The IN’s sustained growth over the
past few years has, in fact, become an excuse for the PN to push for
its own development and expansion of assets. In an article written for a
Pakistan daily in May 2012, Tauqir Naqvi, a retired Vice Admiral of the
PN, suggested that the ‘hegemonic’ elements of the Indian Navy’s
maritime strategy have been the main drivers of the resurgence of the
Pakistan Navy. The article, when read closely, is a dead give-away of
Pakistan’s real ambitions with regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear
submarines.
Naqvi writes extensively about India’s strategic
vision, characterising it as a “hegemonic” impulse that has led the IN
to aim for control of the seas over an area extending from the Red Sea
in the West to Fiji in the Pacific Ocean. While Pakistan, he contends,
is a “peace-loving” nation, India has never been serious about
developing friendly relations, fixated as it has been with the “idea of
projecting power”. Surprisingly, he showers Indian scientists and the IN
with some unexpected, even if ‘motivated’ praise, by mentioning the
sterling efforts of the Indian scientific community and shipyard workers
in operationalising a strategic maritime capability. The complimentary
references are, in effect, a none-too-disguised message to Pakistan’s
political leadership and mandarins in the defence ministry about the
ineluctable need for Pakistan to buttress its own strategic arsenal with
naval nuclear missiles and a nuclear submarine, without which, the PN
can forget about countering the “evil designs” of the Indian Navy.
It
is, however, Naqvi’s references to India’s two nuclear submarines—INS
Chakra (SSN) and INS Arihant (SSBN)—that dispel all doubts about the
real intentions behind the avidly rendered piece. Naqvi opines that the
threat that the two nuclear platforms collectively pose to the security
of Pakistan, is near-existential. It is the completion of the Triad
(land, air and sea based nuclear weapons), he observes, that gives India
the confidence to respond with nuclear weapons, even if it is made to
absorb a first nuclear strike. INS Arihant is that crucial second strike
capability which could give India the vital edge during a conflict. The
SSBN, he concludes, is an essential component of a nuclear arsenal, one
that Pakistan must singularly pursue.
However, in his enthusiasm
to convince Pakistan’s defence establishment about the need for a SSBN,
Naqvi overstates his case when he mentions the “diplomatic advantage”
that may accrue to India on account of its nuclear submarine. There is
hardly any modern precedent of a nuclear submarine (by itself) being an
effective instrument of ‘diplomatic persuasion’, as he suggests. Nor
does it really help in negotiating with other states possessing similar
capability, as cooperation and negotiation in the strategic realm has to
do with ‘bottom-line’ naval capacities in securing maritime interests
and an overlap in strategic interests. While maritime cooperation does
lead to economic benefits, it is not on account of possessing a
ballistic nuclear weapon submarine capability, which is purely for the
purposes of strategic deterrence.
The Arihant is a significant
addition to the Indian Navy’s arsenal but it does not introduce a
strategic imbalance in the India-Pakistan context, as India, by
embracing a ‘No First Use’ doctrine, has already renounced the strategic
advantage. The Arihant’s introduction does not alter this basic reality
and is unlikely to tilt the strategic balance drastically. If anything,
its gives India a measure of greater confidence in securing its own
maritime interests, which does not necessarily translate into
overwhelming dominance of the Indian Ocean or greater vulnerability of
Pakistan to India’s strategic weapons.
Given India’s territorial
expanse and the spread of its nuclear weapon sites, even if Pakistan did
get a nuclear missile capable submarine, it would not be able to
neutralise India’s broader nuclear weapon capability, with or without
the Arihant. As regards the comparison of combat capabilities of
conventional submarines and SSNs/SSBNs, it is well established that the
former are not ‘inferior’ operational combat platforms merely on account
of the absence of nuclear propulsion or nuclear weapons. Both these
capabilities (though vital strategically) rarely come in handy in a
tactical scenario. Admiral Naqvi again exaggerates his case by
suggesting that the Pakistan Navy’s conventional submarines would not be
able to stand up to India’s SSBN.
Interestingly, signs that the
PN has been thinking seriously about nuclear submarines have been around
for some time now. As early as in 2008, in an interview to a Pakistan
daily, the then PN Chief, Admiral Noman Bashir, had said that Pakistan
was quite capable of building a nuclear submarine and would do so “if
required”. Pakistan, he said, is a recognized nuclear power and if the
government made a decision, the nation would develop a nuclear weapon.
In February 2012, Admiral Asif Sandhila, the present Chief of the PN,
stated to the Pakistani media that the PN was mindful of India’s plans
to complete the sea-based arm of its nuclear triad, and was “taking
necessary measures to restore the strategic balance” in the Indian Ocean
region.
Questions, however, remain on Pakistan’s capability to
design and develop a sea-based nuclear missile. Even China, which is
known to be helping Pakistan in its nuclear capabilities, does not
possess a credible submarine-launched missile. The odds that Pakistan
will succeed in developing its undersea nuclear ballistic missile
without assistance from China are highly unfavourable. Even if it did
manage to get an SSBN, it is not certain whether the Pakistan Navy will
be in a position to undertake the responsibility of the nation’s
second-strike capability.
Therefore, the recent drive by PN’s
senior serving and retired naval officers to persuade the security
establishment as well as the man on the street of the necessity of a
nuclear submarine capability appears ill-founded, if not disingenuous.
Outwardly, it may serve to create a sense of insecurity—vital in
persuading politicians about the need for a new capability—but the
manifest lack of strategic logic will eventually convince few.
Pakistan’s
naval leadership will also be aware of the risks and financial costs of
developing and operating a nuclear submarine—the need to constantly
refine equipment and train personnel; of razor-sharp communications and
command and control systems; and the requirement of mastering safety
procedures. In the final analysis the SSBN is not an asset if it is not
mastered well and operated optimally. Merely possessing one offers no
strategic advantages.
