The Defense Department is threatening to sue
former Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette, whose pseudonymously published book
about the killing of Osama bin Laden went on sale this week. Pentagon
officials say the book, No Easy Day,
reveals classified information and puts American lives at risk. Has the
disclosure of classified information ever led directly to an American
death?
Possibly. There have been attacks and assassinations after
intelligence leaks, but the causal link is difficult to prove. Consider
the killing of CIA station chief Richard Welch, gunned down in Athens, Greece, by Marxist terrorists in 1975. The Athens News had outed Welch a month before the killing, and U.S. officials suspected that disaffected former CIA agent Philip Agee
was responsible for the leak. Agee had dedicated his life to
identifying American intelligence agents, naming more than 200
operatives in the book Inside the Company: CIA Diary and working on the magazine CounterSpy,
which had previously identified Welch as a spy when he was doing a
stint in Lima, Peru. Agee, however, steadfastly denied involvement in
the Welch outing, and there is evidence that Welch’s activities in
Greece weren’t completely hush-hush. His Athens home had previously
housed several CIA station chiefs, and the book Who’s Who in the CIA,
published in
East Germany in 1968, listed Welch years before Agee began outing agents. Thirty-seven years after Welch’s death, it’s still unclear exactly how his assassins came to know he was an operative.
East Germany in 1968, listed Welch years before Agee began outing agents. Thirty-seven years after Welch’s death, it’s still unclear exactly how his assassins came to know he was an operative.
The Welch-Agee story is just one of many difficult-to-prove cases in
which a leak may have led to American deaths. During World War I, the
best code-breaker in the United States was a former telegraph agent
named Herbert Yardley. Under his leadership, U.S. intelligence agents
deciphered communications from eight foreign governments, and shortly
after the war, Yardley broke the communications code of Imperial Japan.
The Hoover administration, however, viewed code-breaking as
unethical—Secretary of State Henry Stimson famously remarked, “Gentlemen
do not read each other’s mail”—and
cut the program in the late 1920s. Struggling through the Great
Depression without his lucrative government post, Yardley published an unauthorized memoir
that humiliated and enraged Japanese officials. They completely
overhauled their encryption techniques, and American intelligence was
slow to recover its advantage. When U.S. agents intercepted Japanese
cables on Dec. 6, 1941, it took them hours to decode messages that
suggested an attack was imminent. It’s highly speculative, but some
historians today wonder whether the United States would have been better
prepared for the Pearl Harbor invasion if Yardley had kept his secrets.Matt Bissonnette’s tell-all about the bin Laden operation is not the
first book by a former government insider to raise the ire of
intelligence officials. In the early 1970s, former CIA agent Victor
Marchetti attempted to publish a memoir about his time in the agency.
The CIA, however, successfully sued for the right to redact classified
material from the book before publication. When The CIA: The Cult of Intelligence
was released in 1974, it contained 168 redactions, which the publisher
indicated with black lines. The agency also forced former agent Frank
Snepp to hand over the profits of his 1977 book Decent Interval, for his failure to obtain CIA approval.
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