When Algerian commandos initiated a raid Thursday to free hostages being held at a remote natural-gas complex, it was apparently a surprise to the top levels of the Obama administration as well as America’s key international allies. American workers were believed to be at the sprawling facility, and while details remain sketchy, U.S. officials said Friday that at least one American was killed. hat Algeria didn’t inform the U.S.—much less collaborate with it—before launching the raid should come as no surprise. Since 9/11, both the Bush and Obama administrations have tried to cultivate a relationship with Algeria’s military, intelligence, and security ministries. There have been occasional successes. Algerian officers have trained with the U.S. military; U.S. intelligence agencies shared overhead imagery of Algeria’s vast border; and the two sides at times cooperated against a common enemy, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the group’s North African affiliate.
But
in general, distrust has been a hallmark of the strained relationship
between the U.S. and Algeria. Under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the
Algerian military has never agreed to the large kinds of defense aid
packages other North African allies like Morocco and Egypt accepted.
Known as foreign military financing, these kinds of grants can
theoretically give the U.S. leverage over—and insight into—foreign
militaries. (Algeria’s primary weapons supplier is Moscow, a
relationship that goes back to the Cold War, when the Russians trained
Algeria’s intelligence service and military.)
Algeria
has also at times chafed at U.S. decisions. In January 2010, the
Transportation Security Administration included Algeria on a watch list
of national passports that would receive more scrutiny at airports
following the attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight from
Amsterdam to Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009.
A
few weeks later, the Algerian government formally protested the TSA
decision, according to a Jan. 6, 2010, State Department cable since
disclosed by WikiLeaks. That cable also said that in a separate meeting
the day before, the Algerian government approved the over flight of U.S.
EP-3 spy planes in the Sahel region of the country to monitor AQIM strongholds.
“They
want overhead imagery, access to intelligence to control that vast
space. We did help them to an extent in this realm,” says Ian Lesser, a
senior director for foreign and security policy for the U.S. German
Marshall Fund, a U.S.-based think tank and an expert in Algeria. “But in
terms of military to military cooperation, we do not have the decades
and years of joint training and exchanges…we have with other countries
in the region.”
Since 2008, the U.S. has spent
about $1 million a year from the International Military Education and
Training Program to bring Algerian military officers to the United
States for advanced military education. These exchanges are meant to
give U.S. military officers a personal relationship with the future
leaders of foreign militaries. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of staff
for Pakistan’s military, for example, studied at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. When he was
there, he got to know a young officer named David Petraeus, who would go
on to lead the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.